Controlling Guns: A Call for Consistency in Judicial
Review of Challenges to Gun Control Legislation
The topic of gun control' in the United States is controversial
for several reasons. First, the scope and meaning of an individual's
right to keep and bear arms, which is guaranteed by the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution,' has been unclear
and has thus given rise to debate over an individual's right to possess arms. 3 Some attempts at controlling an individual's right to
1 See Diana J. Theos, Research Project, Federal FirearmLegislation, 6 HAMLINE L.
REV. 409, 409 (1983). Theos stated that the initial enactment of federal gun control
laws was made in the 1920's and 1930's. Id. Theos found that gun control laws later
developed as crime prevention measures as evidenced by the passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968. Id. Theos proposed that opponents of the Gun Control Act of 1968,
which curbed crime by restricting gun ownership, would rather see gun control legislation focus on punishing those who criminally use firearms instead of legislation
which restricts gun ownership. Id. at 409-10. According to Robert Dowlut, "[g]un
control laws have at least five political functions: (1) increase citizen reliance on government and tolerance of increased police powers and abuse; (2) facilitate repressive
action by government; (3) help prevent opposition to government; (4) lessen pressure for major or radical reform; [and] (5) allow selective enforcement against dissidents." Robert Dowlut, Federal and State Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 59, 82 (1989).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. II. The Second Amendment reads in its entirety: "A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." Id.
3 See Bernard J. Bordenet, The Right to Possess Arms: The Intent of the Framers of the
Second Amendment, 21 U. WEST. LA. L. REV. 1, 4, 13-14, 16, 21 (1990). Bordenet
concluded that arms possession is an undeniable right of citizenship. Id. at 29. According to Bordenet:
If a state militia guarantee rather than an individual right of citizens to
keep and bear arms were the purpose of the Second Amendment, it
would have been totally unnecessary and irrelevant to include any guarantee of "the right of the people to keep and bear arms," since by its
very nature a militia is necessarily an armed force and without arms it
would be impossible to carry out its constitutional functions of suppressing insurrections and repelling invasions.
Id. at 14. Bordenet argued that the purpose of the Second Amendment is to guarantee "the right of the people to keep and bear arms so as to provide the foundation for
a national militia" to protect the liberty and freedom of all citizens. Id. at 16.
Bordenet found that a right to arms in general includes a right to keep arms in one's
home, whether for self-defense or "possible militia use," as well as to protect individuals from government oppression. Id. at 29.
For a different interpretation of the right to keep and bear arms, see Keith A.
Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have
You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5, 7,40 (1989). According to
Ehrman and Henigan, the keeping and bearing of arms by individuals is not guaranteed by the Second Amendment for private, non-militia purposes. Id. at 40. The
authors found that "[t]here is no evidence that the Framers discussed, much less intended, that the amendment provide a guarantee to individuals of a right to be armed
1 AI'"
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possess and carry guns through gun control legislation have succeeded, 4 while other attempts have failed due to lobbying efforts of
groups such as the National Rifle Association (NRA).1 A second
obstacle to a consensus on the issue of gun control concerns the
lack of an articulated standard balancing the extent of Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution to control the movement of guns in interstate commerce with
citizens' Second Amendment rights.6 Furthermore, an underfor purposes unrelated to militia service." Id. at 7. Ehrman and Henigan argued that
the language of the Second Amendment does not show an intention by the Framers
to create an individual right to weapons outside of the realm of the military. Id. at 32.
Instead, Ehrman and Henigan proposed that a right of the people to bear arms only
exists as a means to defend the state. Id. at 33.
A further interpretation of the Second Amendment is that it grants a collective
right of the state to maintain a militia as well as an individual's right to bear arms.
David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiographyof the Bill of Rights, 4J.L. &
POL. 1, 13 (1987). According to Hardy, the Second Amendment does not have one
meaning but instead, the Second Amendment's "militia component and its right to
bear arms recognition have in fact different origins and theoretical underpinnings."
Id. at 3. As a result, Hardy proposed that the two components had to merge to become what is known as the Second Amendment. Id. at 3-4. Hardy argued that restricting the Second Amendment to only one interpretation is ignorant in light of the
history of its formation. Id. at 59-60.
4 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930 (1988 & Supp. V. 1994) (setting forth the current version of the Gun Control Act of 1968); Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, H.R.
1025, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.CA.N. 1536, 1536-46,
1984-85 (footnotes omitted) (establishing "a national, five-working-day waiting period
for the purchase of a handgun" and noting that the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act was developed in response to the epidemic of gun violence prevalent in the
United States).
5 See Carl T. Bogus, Pistols, Politics and ProductsLiability, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1103,
1104 (1991) (asserting that the NRA has been able to "frustrate the will of the nearly
three-quarters of Americans who favor more rigorous controls over handguns"). Bogus found that the NRA is among this country's most powerful lobbies. Id. at 1156.
Bogus argued that NRA supporters are able to combat proposed gun control legislation with letters, phone calls, and visits to various legislators, and by financial contributions to NRA's political action committee. Id. One of the NRA's strongest lobbying
efforts came to fruition with the passage of the Firearms Owners' Protection Act. See
H.R. 4332, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327. This act was
partially designed to relieve firearms owners and dealers from any ownership burdens
they experienced under the Gun Control Act of 1968. Id.
6 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause reads in its entirety:
"The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Id.
The first case to interpret the meaning of the Commerce Clause was Gibbons v.
Ogden, in which the Supreme Court suggested that the words of the clause "comprehend every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign
nations." 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824). The Court also determined that
"[c]ommerce among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each
State, but may be introduced into the interior." Id. at 194.
For a discussion of the courts' deference to administrative agencies in decisions
concerning the movement of guns in interstate commerce, see David E. McCauley,
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standing of the appropriate extent of gun control has also been
complicated by the concept of controlling guns through products
liability law, which holds gun manufacturers liable in tort to the
victims of gun violence.7
The best arbiter of this controversy is the judicial branch of
government, which is empowered to exercise judicial review over
all challenged legislation. 8 Although the role of the judiciary is not
Case Comment, Administrative Law-Agency Discretion andJudicialReview, 14 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L LJ. 198, 202-03 (1990) (citing Gun South, Inc. v. Brady, 877 F.2d 858,
862 (11th Cir. 1989)) (other citations omitted) (reviewing Gun South and demonstrating that the Gun Control Act of 1968, which regulates America's importation of firearms, allows only for importation of those weapons deemed appropriate for sporting
purposes). For a discussion of Congress's power to control the movement of guns in
interstate commerce pursuant to the Commerce Clause, see Charles R. Reddick,
Note, Interstate Commerce Nexus Requirement Defined For Firearm Possession By Felons, 29
MERCER L. REV. 867, 867-68, 869, 872-73 (1978) (citing Scarborough v. United
States, 431 U.S. 563, 575, 577 (1977)) (other citations omitted) (arguing that, under
Scarborough,a felon can be convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm under § 1202
(a) (1) of the Gun Control Act of 1968 if the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce at some remote time).
7 See Bogus, supranote 5, at 1104-05. Bogus explored basic products liability principles and posited that manufacturer liability for the use of guns in criminal offenses
and accidents grew out of these basic principles. Id. at 1105-28.
The first case to define the parameters of products liability law was Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 400-01 (Cal. 1962) (citations omitted). In
Greenman, the California Supreme Court held that manufacturer liability is established where a plaintiff proves that he sustained an injury, while using a product for
its intended use, because he was unaware that there was a defect in the design and
manufacture that made the product unsafe. Id. at 901. For further discussion of the
Greenman case, see DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 615-19 (2d ed.
1993).
One aspect of products liability law involves products with defective designs. Id.
at 630 (citation omitted). In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., the Supreme Court of
California defined the meaning of defective product design, noting that:
a product is defective in design either (1) if the product has failed to
perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in
an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or
(2) if, in light of the relevant factors ... the benefits of the challenged
design do not outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.
573 P.2d 443, 446 (Cal. 1978).
According to one commentator, banning handguns through products liability
law may obstruct the constitutionally protected right of individuals to keep and bear
arms. Stephen P. Halbrook, Tort Liability for the Manufacture, Sale, and Ownership of
Handguns, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 351, 364-79 (1983). Halbrook recognized that some
handguns, such as a traditionally-designed single action revolver, may not have sufficient safety mechanisms. Id. at 358-59. Halbrook argued, however, that tort law
should not be used to eliminate the existence of handguns completely, but rather to
ensure society's access to safe and reliable firearms. Id. at 364.
8 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-80 (1803) (establishing and
explaining the concept of judicial review).
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to amend the Constitution,9 the judiciary can take an active role in
formulating a solid and unyielding standard by which to interpret
gun control legislation.1 ° Unfortunately, thus far, when deciding
cases that involve challenges to gun control laws, the judiciary has
failed to fully examine the interplay between Second Amendment
rights and the Commerce Clause, and has not considered the
repercussions of attributing products liability law haphazardly to
gun manufacturers. 1
This Comment seeks to define the proper role of the judiciary
in deciding cases that involve gun control issues, and proposes that
much-needed gun control legislation can survive constitutional
muster. Part I of this Comment examines the position that the judiciary has taken in the past with regard to Second Amendment
challenges to gun control legislation. This Part suggests that the
judiciary has done a disservice to both proponents and opponents
of more effective gun control by misinterpreting and avoiding a
more thorough analysis of the meaning of the Second Amendment. Part II examines the deferential position that the judiciary
9 See U.S. CONST. art. V. With regard to the amendment process, Article V
provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a
Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be
valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no
Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight
hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth
Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
Id.
10 See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST No. 78, in SELECTED
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 179, 182 (Morton J.
Frisch ed., 1985). Exploring the proper role of the courts as the third branch of
government, Hamilton noted:
It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an
intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order,
among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their
authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar
province of the courts.
Id.
I See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This provision outlines the role of the judiciary in the United States government and reads in pertinent part: "The Judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." Id.
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has taken in the past with regard to Commerce Clause challenges
to gun control legislation and calls for the courts to balance Congress's Commerce Clause powers with individuals' Second Amendment rights when reviewing gun legislation created under the
Clause. Part III discusses the propriety of the judiciary's extension
of products liability principles to gun manufacturers as a means of
effectuating gun control. In conclusion, Part IV summarizes and
defines the role that the judiciary must play in deciding future
cases that involve gun control measures.
I.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT

Historical evidence leading to the formation and adoption of
the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution allows
for different interpretations of the Amendment's meaning.1 2 As a
result, United States courts have rendered conflicting decisions re12 See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 3, at 7-14. Ehrman and Henigan examined
the historical underpinnings of the Second Amendment, which came from the English Bill of Rights of 1688 and qualified the right to bear arms with the added phrase,
"'suitable to their conditions, and as allowed by law.'" Id. at 13 (quotation omitted).
The authors then argued that the English tradition of regulating arms was adopted by
the American colonists. Id. at 14. They found that the idea of regulating arms, especially in the military context, that was inherited from the English, was not forgotten
with the adoption of an American Constitution and Bill of Rights. See id. at 20, 23-24,
32. As stated by Ehrman and Henigan, "[tihe background of the Second Amendment indicates that Congress did not intend to confer a broad 'individual' right to
carry arms, outside of the military context." Id. at 32 (citation omitted). The authors
proposed that the Framers designed the Second Amendment to ensure that an effective state militia existed to protect against a tyrannical federal government. Id. at 33.
Ehrman and Henigan characterized the Second Amendment as granting each state
the ability to establish and maintain an effective militia where the federal government
so failed. Id. at 39. According to the co-authors, the Second Amendment protects the
right of an individual to possess a firearm only where such possession is necessary to
maintaining an effective state militia. Id.
Equally persuasive is the historical analysis that leads to a different interpretation
of the Second Amendment. See Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right to BearArms in the First
State Bills of Rights: Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Vermont, and Massachusetts, 10 VT. L.
REV. 255, 255 (1985). Halbrook examined the historical underpinnings of some of
the first state bills of rights and argued that the intent of their framers regarding the
right of the people to keep and bear arms was consistent with the intent of the framers of the Second Amendment. Id. at 255-314. Interestingly, Halbrook's thesis invites
the interpretation that some courts in the first states may have interpreted their own
provisions too narrowly for the right of the people to keep and bear arms by only
allowing such a right for the collective or common defense. See id. at 260-63. Halbrook surmised that "the arms guarantees of the four state bills of rights which preceded the federal second amendment were intended to protect the right to keep
arms and to bear arms individually for self-defense and in groups for militia purposes." Id. at 314. Finally, Halbrook emphasized that an individual right to personal
weaponry was fundamental and unquestioned, unlike the rights of free press and religious issues which engendered much controversy. Id. at 314-15.
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garding Second Amendment challenges to gun control laws. 13
13 See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551-53 (1875). The Cruikshankcase
involved a 16-count indictment for conspiracy under § 6 of the Enforcement Act of
1870. Id. at 548 (citation omitted). In response to the second and tenth counts, the
defendants asserted a Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for a lawful
purpose. Id. at 553. The United States Supreme Court rejected defendants' Second
Amendment interpretation, finding that the Constitution does not guarantee the
right to bear arms nor does such a right derive from any constitutional provision. Id.
The Court also decided that the Second Amendment guarantees only that the right to
keep and bear arms shall not be deprived by the government. Id. The Court reached
these conclusions based upon the premise that no rights could be acquired under the
Constitution unless the United States government had the authority to grant such
rights. Id. at 551. Although the decision only made a brief reference to Second
Amendment issues, the Court intimated that the right to bear arms for a lawful purpose exists independent of the Constitution. See id. at 553. One commentator has
posited that the Cruikshank decision articulated that the Constitution guarantees,
rather than grants, specific rights which predated its creation. Dowlut, supra note 1,
at 71-72 (citation omitted).
The second United States Supreme Court decision involving Second Amendment interpretation was Presser v. Illinois. See 116 U.S. 252, 260, 264 (1886). Presser
was charged with unlawful membership in an unauthorized group of men who
paraded and drilled with arms in Chicago and represented themselves as a military
organization without a license. Id. at 254.' The Court upheld the Illinois statute proscribing Presser's conduct. Id. at 269. The Court decided that the Second Amendment limits only the power of Congress and the national government from infringing
upon the right to keep and bear arms but does not limit the power of the states. Id. at
265 (citations omitted). According to the Court, the states' power would be limited
only by the fact that the states could not prohibit the people from "keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for maintaining
the public security." Id. In effect, the Presserdecision manipulated Cruikshank by minimizing the Cruikshank idea that the people must look to their States for the protection of their right to keep and bear arms. See id. Instead, Presserpostulated that States
could infringe upon Second Amendment rights unless arms were being used for the
purpose of organizing a well-regulated militia. See id.
The Court's reasoning in United States v. Miller appears to have adopted some of
the ideas of the Presserdecision to formulate the scope of an individual's right under
the Second Amendment. See 307 U.S. 174, 178-79, 182 & n.3 (1939) (citing Presser,
116 U.S. at 264-66) (other citations omitted). The Miller case involved the movement
of a double barrel 12-gauge shotgun in interstate commerce. Id. at 175. The Court
found that the Second Amendment only protects an individual's right to possess
weapons if the weapon itself reasonably relates to the maintenance of a well-regulated
militia or could serve the common defense. Id. at 178 (citation omitted). With narrow reasoning, the Court seemed to tailor its opinion based on the attributes of the
double barrel 12-gauge shotgun, and intimated that unless a weapon could be viewed
as one weapon for the common defense or military use, an individual had no right to
possess it. See id.
According to Dowlut, the Millerdecision failed to answer the obvious question of
whether modern massive destruction weapons could be possessed by individuals
where these weapons may be used by a military. Dowlut, supra note 1, at 74. Elaborating on this point, some have argued that the Miller holding was suspect because of its
juxtaposition with the state's right view of the Second Amendment and its unclear
analysis of the goal of a militia. See Jay R. Wagner, Comment, Gun Control Legislation
and the Intent of the Second Amendment: To What Extent Is There an IndividualRight to Keep
and Bear Arms?, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1407, 1410-12, 1414 & n.30 (1992) (citing Miller, 307
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Even more problematic than inconsistent decision-making is the
courts' subsequent use of these contradictory rulings as sources for
opinions in other gun control cases. 14 These inconsistencies stem
U.S. at 178-79) (other citations omitted). Wagner furthered that if the Miller holding
was to be given its literal meaning, each individual would be permitted to keep and
bear the kind of weaponry used by the modem military. Id. at 1447 (citations
omitted).
14 See Wagner, supra note 13, at 1446 (citations omitted) (stating that "lower federal courts have closed the door on constitutional scrutiny of individual possession of
firearms by concluding, based on a misinterpretation of Miller, that there is no individual right to keep and bear arms"). The misinterpretation of Miller was evident in
Stevens v. United States. Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971). In
Stevens, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that no express
constitutional right exists for an individual to possess a firearm. Id. (citing Miller, 307
U.S. at 178). The defendant, Frank Stevens, was convicted in Kentucky for armed
assault with intent to rob and for voluntary manslaughter constituting wilful and
knowing possession of a firearm. Id. at 145. Stevens's crime was penalized under
Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which criminalized the possession of firearms that have traveled in interstate commerce. Id. (citation omitted). Overgeneralizing, however, the court expressed that no individual
right exists to possess a firearm, ignoring the aspect of the Miller decision which stated
that an individual has a right to possess weapons if the weapon serves a military purpose. See id. at 149 (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178). Thus, even though Stevens' possession of a firearm could be constitutionally curtailed under the Commerce Clause, the
court inaccurately added Second Amendment commentary on the right to keep and
bear arms, and therefore documented a misinterpretation of Miller. See id.
The Miller decision was also done a disservice in United States v. Nelsen. United
States v. Nelsen, 859 F.2d 1318, 1320 (8th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). In Nelsen,
the defendant, John Nelsen, was convicted of violating the Switchblade Knife Act of
1982. Id. at 1318 (citation omitted). Nelsen made Second Amendment and due process challenges to the Act. Id. at 1319. In regard to the Second Amendment challenges, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit briefly commented
that no fundamental right to keep and bear arms has existed for at least 100 years. Id.
at 1320 (citation omitted). The court also stated that cases have analyzed the Second
Amendment only as it relates to the protection of state militias. Id. (citing Miller, 307
U.S. at 178) (other citations omitted). Thus, even though Nelsen was properly convicted on grounds independent of his right to keep and bear arms, the Nelsen decision
documented an overgeneralization of the meaning of Miller. See id.
Other cases have found the Miller holding illogical in the present day of nuclear
and more sophisticated weaponry and have consequently chosen to ignore it. See, e.g.,
Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942) (finding the Miller proposition that individuals could keep and bear arms that served a military use to be inaccurate) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943), and cert. denied, 324 U.S. 889
(1945). The court found that as the technology of military weapons advanced with
time, it would be inconceivable for a private person to possess such weapons. Id.
Instead, the court argued that each Second Amendment case must be decided on its
own facts. Id.
Additionally, in United States v. Warin, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals cited the
decisions in Miller, Cases, and Stevens. See 530 F.2d 103, 105-06 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976). The court argued that Miller did not answer the question
of the extent to which a military weapon could be regulated. Id. The court then
agreed with the Cases argument that Miller did not set forth any general rules and that
Miller should not be interpreted to suggest that individuals can possess any weapons
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from confusion about the scope and historical foundation of the
Second Amendment.1 5
It is not clear, however, whether the judiciary has truly attempted to analyze the meaning of the Second Amendment in
reaching decisions or has merely chosen to ignore it to avoid political confrontation.1 6 Regardless of the efforts or motivations of the
judiciary, when courts have interpreted the Second Amendment in
cases involving gun control challenges, the resulting decisions have
failed to acknowledge the Amendment's origins.1 7 As a result, the
judiciary has failed to establish whether the Second Amendment
confers a collective or an individual right to bear arms, thus particularly complicating review of Second Amendment challenges to
gun control legislation."8
used by the military in light of the existence of nuclear weapons. Id. at 106 (citations
omitted). Then, the court stated that there was no doubt that the meaning of the
Second Amendment is to guarantee a collective rather than an individual right to
keep and bear arms. Id. (citing Stevens, 440 F.2d at 149). The court then returned to
the proposition that "[i]t is also established that the collective right of the militia is
limited to keeping and bearing arms, the possession or use of which 'at this time has
some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia."' Id. (citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 178) (other citations omitted).
15 SeeJoyce L. Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common
Law Tradition, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285, 287-89 (1983). Malcolm found that
the scholarly community is to blame for misinterpretation as opposed to the legal
community. Id. at 287. Malcolm argued that the controversy turns on the correct
interpretation of the Second Amendment and, therefore, to understand it, one must
thoroughly examine how the English traditions, the English Bill of Rights, and the
American Bill of Rights influenced the colonists. Id.
16 See Wagner, supra note 13, at 1457 (footnote omitted). Wagner argued that the
federal courts have avoided reviewing gun control laws and have instead adopted the
legal fiction that the Second Amendment merely affords states a right to maintain a
militia. Id. Deciding that the Miller decision has been misinterpreted, Wagner opined
that the reasoning of Miller itself was flawed because it was based upon an inaccurate
interpretation of the term militia. Id. at 1411 (citations omitted). Wagner posited
that Miller suggested that individuals would need to supply their own weaponry to
organize a militia and therefore does not espouse a state's right view that denies an
individual right to keep and bear arms. Id. at 1414 (citation omitted). Thus, Wagner
found that any case which cites Miller for the proposition of a collective right to keep
and bear arms renders an inaccurate interpretation of the Second Amendment. Id.
17 See supra notes 13 & 14 (listing cases which lack analysis of the Second Amendment's historical underpinnings). The United States Supreme Court cases addressing
the Second Amendment have failed to interpret the Amendment with an understanding of its history and meaning. Kurt F. Kluin, Gun Control: Is It a Legal and Effective
Means of ControllingFirearmsin the United States?, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 244, 251 (1982).
Disappointingly, Kluin found that courts have failed to differentiate between the Second Amendment's meaning and the reasons for its implementation by the first Congress. Id. at 247 (footnotes omitted). According to Kluin, the right to keep and bear
arms has common law origins. Id. (citation omitted).
18 Id. at 245-46. Kluin proposed that the Second Amendment can be interpreted
to grant two different kinds of rights: (1) an individual right to bear arms or (2) a
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The judiciary fails to adequately serve its citizenry if it does not
accurately review and interpret the scope of individuals' constitutional rights.1 9 The erratic and ill-defined pattern of adjudication
reflects a dire need for standardized decision-making.2" The judiciary can begin to remedy inconsistencies by developing a final and
conclusive interpretation of the Second Amendment.2 ' Importantly, even a judiciary that favors gun control legislation can feel
comfortable with an interpretation of the Second Amendment that
grants both an individual and collective fundamental right to keep
and bear arms, because that conclusion is historically
collective right to bear arms. Id. In light of this, Kluin found that courts have rendered restrictive opinions concerning interpretation of the Second Amendment that
have led to the phenomenon of the Second Amendment being interpreted as granting no rights to citizens. Id. at 246-47. Kluin opined that the Second Amendment has
become meaningless because courts have failed to distinguish between its meaning
and the reasons for its adoption. Id. at 247. Furthermore, Kluin argued that the
United States Supreme Court has failed to establish a definitive ruling on the Second
Amendment's meaning. Id. at 249. Consequently, state court decisions addressing
the issue of the right to bear arms have been influenced by and parallel the amorphous Supreme Court reasoning. Id. at 253 (footnotes omitted).
19 See GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 35 (2d ed. 1991). The
authors enunciate the importance of judicial review for the American system of
government.
It is often suggested that the tension between judicial review and democracy would be eliminated, or at least sharply reduced, if judicial review were simply a mechanical process of deciding whether an act of
Congress violated some decision made by the ratifiers of the Constitution. If the act of interpretation were essentially mechanical, and involved no exercise of discretion or will on the part of the judges, the
problems of democracy would be minimized. In such circumstances,
the judges would not be imposing their own value choices, but would
instead be forcing current legislatures to conform to earlier choices
made by the people.
Id.
20 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936) ("When an act of Congress is
appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the Government has only one duty,-to lay the article of
the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former.").
21 See Malcolm, supra note 15, at 289. Malcolm articulated that practically all legal
scholars agree that an accurate interpretation of the Second Amendment is indispensable to resolving the controversy over gun ownership and that an accurate interpretation can only be achieved through a clarification of common law concepts. Id.
History, according to Malcolm, reveals that the royal charters that created the American colonies assured potential English emigrants that they would enjoy all English
liberties in the colonies. Id. (citation omitted). Malcolm argued that, as citizens of
developing societies, the colonists needed to be armed to insure their survival. Id.
(citation omitted). Malcolm found that, as descendants of the English legal traditions, the American colonists were imbued with an anti-authoritarian attitude. Id. at
290.
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substantiated.22
To determine whether a right is expressly or impliedly fundamental, courts have examined the majestic generalities of the Bill
of Rights and the Constitution, and have interpreted these generalities from either an originalist or non-originalist perspective. 2 The
United States Supreme Court has found certain rights, such as the
right to free speech, to be expressly fundamental because they are
clearly stated in the Constitution. 24 The Court has found still other
rights to be implicitly fundamental. 25 Any legislative burdens
placed on fundamental rights are strictly scrutinized because fundamental rights are essential for the maintenance of individual liberties. 26 Nevertheless, the Court can uphold legislation that
22 See Wagner, supra note 13, at 1448-49 (footnotes omitted). From an historical
standpoint, Wagner proposed that upon the adoption of the Second Amendment to
the United States Constitution, the framers clearly considered the right of the people
to keep and bear arms to be "among the most fundamental of all rights." Id. at 1449
(citation omitted). Wagner found this right integral to the people's ability to protect
themselves against governmental attempts to deprive them of their liberties. Id. at
1448-49 (footnotes omitted); see also Bordenet, supra note 3, at 29 (concluding that
arms possession is an undeniable right of citizens); Dowlut, supra note 1, at 64 (cita'
tion omitted) (noting thatJames Madison wrote that " the advantage of being armed'
was a condition 'the Americans possess[ed] over the people of almost every other
nation"'); Stephen P. Halbrook, Encroachments of the Crown on the Liberty of the Subject:
Pre-Revolutionaty Origins of the Second Amendment, 15 U. DAYITON L. REV. 91, 93 & n.16
(1989) (stating that the Court recognized in Robertson v. Baldwin that "'the first ten
amendments to the constitution . . . [were] to embody certain guaranties [sic] and
immunities which we inherited from our English ancestors"') (citing Robertson v.
Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897)).
23 See STONE, supranote 19, at 759-68 (weighing an originalist approach to constitutional analysis that enforces clearly stated or implicit provisions, versus a nonoriginalist interpretation that permits courts to go beyond, and often contradict, the
clear intentions of the Constitution's framers).
24 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment reads in its entirety: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." Id. The Court has reasoned that free speech is protected "except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969) (footnote omitted).
25 See STONE, supranote 19, at 814-23, 875 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 629-31 (1969) (citations and quotations omitted) (announcing the right to
travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (declaring the
right to vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (finding the right to
produce offspring)).
26 Wagner, supra note 13, at 1447 (footnotes omitted). Wagner found that the
Supreme Court developed the analytical principles of rational basis and strict scrutiny
review to formulate its decisions in cases involving equal protection and fundamental
rights violations. Id. at 1145 & n.205 (citations omitted). For an understanding of
rational basis and strict scrutiny review, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
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infringes upon a fundamental right if that burden meets the test of
strict scrutiny; that is, if the legislation (1) serves a compelling governmental interest and (2) is narrowly tailored to meet that interest.2 7 Notably, even though a fundamental right is strongly
protected from government usurpation, it can be qualified and
curbed when abused.28
Accordingly, it can be argued that the Second Amendment
provides an express fundamental right to gun ownership.'
It
would seem, therefore, that gun control legislation must be subject
to strict scrutiny review.3 ° Even with this standard of review, however, comprehensive gun control legislation could survive a strict
interpretation of the Second Amendment because, as with most
fundamental rights, the right
to keep and bear arms should be
31
right.
qualified
a
deemed
Alternatively, to avoid the imposition of a strict scrutiny standard, restrictions on gun use and ownership may be subjected to a
lower standard of review if the issue is analogized to the situation of
which mandated strict scrutiny review for issues of a basic and fundamental nature,
and United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), which established a
rational basis review for issues of an economic/social nature.
27 See Wagner, supra note 13, at 1448. Wagner argued that governmental interest
in preventing violent gun crimes is compelling, and legislation that is both compelling and narrowly tailored can survive strict scrutiny. Id. at 1458.
28 See Giflow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666-67 (1925) (citations omitted) (stating
that those who abuse the freedom of speech by making "utterances inimical to the
public welfare" may be punished by the state).
29 See U.S. CONST. amend. II. But see United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106
(1976) (finding that the Second Amendment does not confer an express right to
individual arms possession) cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976); Ehrman & Henigan,
supra note 3, at 50-51 (citations omitted) (recognizing that courts have held that an
individual right to keep and bear arms is not fundamental and therefore rational basis
review is appropriate).
30 See Wagner, supra note 13, at 1458 (footnote omitted).
31 See Giow, 268 U.S. at 666-67, 669, 670 (citations omitted) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute abridging the First Amendment right to freedom of speech
in the interest of the general welfare). Compare the right to keep and bear arms with
the First Amendment right to free speech in Gitlow, in which Justice Sanford defined a
qualified right as follows:
It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of
speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution, does not
confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility,
whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that
gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.
Id. at 666-67 (citations omitted). The principle of Gitlow that free speech is not an
absolute right furthers the idea that even though some constitutional rights are fundamental, they may be infringed if the alternative would harm the general welfare.
See id. at 666-70 (citations omitted).
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content-neutral restrictions of free speech. 2 As free speech may
be subject to certain time, place, and manner restrictions, gun use
could conceivably be curtailed via narrowly tailored legislation
which serves a significant governmental interest so long as alternative channels for use remain open."3 In other words, gun ownership in our society should only be exercised in accordance with
specific time, place, and manner restrictions.3 4 Under this approach, a fundamental right to keep and bear arms may be curbed
justifiably via an intermediate level of review."3 It is the role of the
judiciary to safeguard individuals' Second Amendment rights and
to ensure that constitutionally sound and justifiable gun control
legislation passes the appropriate level of scrutiny.3 6
II.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE

I, § 8, CL. 2

Historically, the judiciary has developed an evolving interpretation of the Commerce Clause by creating-and then abandoning-different standards by which to interpret its meaning,
giving deference to Congressional legislation concerning the
movement of guns in interstate commerce. 7 Throughout this cen32 See STONE, supra note 19, at 1257 (defining content-neutral restriction to mean
a limit on the mode of expression without regard to the content or impact of speech).
33 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (articulating that "the government may enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as the
restrictions 'are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication'") (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)) (other
citations omitted).
34 See id. (quotations and citations omitted) (recognizing time, place, and manner
restrictions as appropriate when narrowly drawn to achieve an important government
interest).
35 See id. (quotation and citations omitted) (permitting narrowly drawn, contentneutral restrictions on speech); see also Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117, 119,
121 (1972) (footnotes omitted) (upholding an anti-noise ordinance because it was
narrowly tailored to further a municipality's compelling interest in an undisrupted
school session).
36 See HAMILTON, supra note 10, at 182-84. Hamilton defined the extent ofjudicial review as follows:

The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be
disposed to exercise wil instead of judgment, the consequence would
equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative
body. The observation, if it proved any thing, would prove that there
ought to be no judges distinct from that body.
Id. at 183-84.
37 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824) (interpreting the
phrase "among the several States" to encompass commerce carried on between states
and not solely intrastate trading).
With time, the judiciary accorded Congress greater deference by adopting other
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tury, the judiciary had been willing to adapt an interpretation of
the Commerce Clause to the needs of society, resulting in the creation of a workable standard by which to interpret the Clause's
meaning."8 The judiciary had been inclined to accord wide deference to the legislature, which served as an affirmation of thejudiciary's understanding of Congress's power under that clause.3 9 That
tests for deciding Commerce Clause cases. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 12425 (1942) (quotations omitted) (regulating the movement of goods in interstate commerce by Congress is valid when the goods have a substantial economic effect on the
marketplace); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 518-19, 521 (1922) (regulating an
activity by Congress is a valid exercise of power if it affects interstate commerce under
the stream of commerce test); Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 357
(1903) (regulating the movement of goods deemed injurious to society is a valid exercise of Congressional Commerce Clause power under the pretext test). For further
reading on these and other relevant cases, see STONE, supra note 19, at 151-94,
wherein the author explores and analyzes the historical development of the Commerce Clause from the late nineteenth century through the formalist approach of the
1960s).
38 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (citations omitted) (declaring the regulation at issue consistent with Congress's view of public policy regarding
substandard labor conditions and interstate commerce). In Darly,Justice Stone questioned whether Congress could constitutionally prohibit (1) the shipment in interstate commerce of lumber manufactured by employees who received lower than
minimum wage or work more hours per week than the prescribed maximum and (2)
employment of workers, who produce goods that enter interstate commerce, at other
than established salaries and hours. Id. at 108. Faced with a challenge to The Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, the Court declared that regulations of interstate commerce are to be created and debated by the legislature without restriction by the
courts. Id. at 115 (citations omitted). The Court furthered that the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution does not deprive the national government of the ability to
exercise its granted powers when appropriate. Id. at 124 (citations omitted). Thus,
the Darby Court showed signs of change in its Commerce Clause interpretation by
upholding a prohibition of the interstate shipment of goods produced under substandard labor conditions. See id. at 115. For commentary on Darby, see STONE, supra
note 19, at 190-94.
By 1945, the Court began a trend of deferring to Congress noting that the sole
federalism-based limits on Congress inhered in the political process. Id. at 194. This
deference was exemplified in 1981 with Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, in which the Court stated: "when Congress has determined that an activity affects interstate commerce, the courts need inquire only whether the finding is rational." 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981).
More recently, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Court
gave even greater deference to Congressional action by dismissing any state claims of
lost power and by highlighting the political process as an effective check on Congressional overreaching. See 469 U.S. 528, 550-54 (1985) (footnotes omitted). The Court,
in overturning National League of Cities v. Usery, stated that "the principle and basic
limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action-the
built-in restraints that our system provides through state participation in federal governmental action. The political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the
States will not be promulgated." Id. at 556, 557 (citing National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
39 See Reddick, supra note 6, at 867 & n.2 (citations omitted) (analyzing the
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trend halted, however, with the United States Supreme Court decision United States v. Lopez,4 in which the Court failed to defer to the
legislature and held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990

was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's commerce power.4 1
Prior to Lopez, the judiciary properly adopted a deferential approach in Scarboroughv. United States.42 In Scarborough,the Supreme

Court held that § 1202(a) (1) of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 supported a valid conviction of a felon
found in possession of a firearm if that firearm had travelled in
interstate commerce at any time.4 3 The Court affirmed petitioner

Scarborough's conviction under the statute based on the determination that the weapons he possessed had indeed travelled in interstate commerce at one time.' To reach this conclusion, the Court
deferred to the legislative history of the statute.4 5 The Court found
that Congress intended the statute to have a broad effect.' AcSupreme Court decision in Scarborough v. United States, which involved a challenge to
Tide VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and noting that
the minimal requisite nexus between the Act and interstate commerce is satisfied by
simply showing that a firearm has traveled in interstate commerce at any remote
time).
40 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
41 Id. at 1630-31, 1632. ChiefJustice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the court and
stated that the Gun-Free School Zones Act is unconstitutional because it does not
regulate an activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 1631.
The ChiefJustice found that the situation of guns in school zones is a criminal matter
to be regulated by the States. Id. at 1631 & n.3. Moreover, the Justice stated that the
government's brief conceded that "'[n]either the statute nor its legislative history
contain[s] express congressional findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone'". Id. Thus, the Court refused to hold the
statute constitutional in the interests of federalism. Id. at 1632.
42 See 431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977). The petitioner, Scarborough, had been convicted
previously of drug possession and subsequently was convicted of violating Tide VII of
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 for possessing a Colt revolver, a Universal Enforcer, an M-1 carbine rifle, and a St. Etienne Ordinance revolver. Id. at 563-65, 566 & n.2 (citation omitted). For further commentary on
Scarborough, see Reddick, supra note 6, where the author interprets the meaning and
speculates as to the effect of the Court's decision in Scarborough.
43 Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 566-67 (footnotes omitted).
44

Id.

Id. at 572 (quotation omitted). See also Reddick, supra note 6, at 872. Reddick
noted that the Court analyzed the legislative intent of the statute, which revealed that
.possession of a firearm by a convicted felon had been deemed to threaten not only
commerce, but also other vital American institutions." Id. (citation omitted).
46 Reddick, supra note 6, at 872. Reddick analyzed the legislative impetus for the
formulation of the statute and stated that Congress:
simply hooked the statute into interstate commerce to serve as its constiThe Court noted that since most felons come into
tutional base ....
possession of firearms by clandestine means, it would be an almost impossible task for law enforcement officials to prove whether the felon
actually came into possession of the firearm before or after his convic45
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cordingly, the Court concluded that it was constitutional to deny
Scarborough the right to possess a firearm that had travelled in
interstate commerce at a remote time under the provisions of the
statute although Scarborough had possessed the firearms before
he was ever convicted. * v
Similarly, the judiciary adopted a deferential approach in Gun
South, Inc. v. Brady.4 Gun South concerned GSI, a wholesale gun
dealer that had been licensed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms to import firearms used for sporting purposes. 49 Despite GSI's permit to import AUG-SA rifles, the Secretary of the
Treasury issued a temporary suspension of the importation of certain rifles, including the AUG-SA rifles.5 ° The Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit followed a provision of the Administrative Procedure Act,"1 which prescribed the standard of judicial review for
government agency decisions.5 2 The court upheld the decision of
tion. The remote nexus requirement was then summarized as the only

means which "capture[s] the essence of Congress' intent."
Id. (citing Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 577).
47 Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 576-78. In the opinion, Justice Marshall explained that
it was Congress's intent to reach the possession of firearms broadly. Id. at 577 (quotation omitted). With complete deference to the legislative intent of § 1202(a) (1) of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Justice Marshall declared
that "there is no question that Congress intended no more than a minimal nexus
requirement." Id.
48 877 F.2d 858, 861 (11th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
49 Id. at 859. Prior to its legal dispute with the Secretary of the Treasury, GSI had
applied for permits to import Steyr-Mannlicher AUG semi-automatic rifles in September 1988 and February 1989 after learning that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms (ATF) had authorized the importation of these weapons for sporting purposes. Id. These permits were granted to GSI in October 1988 and February 1989.
Id. They were suspended in March 1989 pursuant to a Bureau decision to re-examine
its policy on banning the importation of all assault-type weapons regardless of sporting purpose. Id. Even though the suspensions were not supposed to be retroactive
against pre-existing permits, GSI's shipment of rifles were seized by Customs Services
at Birmingham Airport. Id. at 859-60.
50 Id. at 859. This suspension was ordered to allow the ATF time to decide whether
certain rifles were actually suitable for sporting purposes, a pre-requisite for importation. Id.
51 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). According to David E. McCauley:
The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) establishes the standard for
judicial review of government agency decisions, such as the Secretary's
decision on the importability of semi-automatic assault weapons. The
APA provides that a reviewing court will not overturn an agency decision unless that decision was reached in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner. If the agency enforcing a statute can give a rational
basis for the decision it has made, then the courts must presume the
decision to be valid, and may not replace it with another decision.
McCauley, supra note 6, at 202-03 (footnotes omitted).
52 Gun South, 877 F.2d at 861 (citations omitted). The court began the discussion
of the opinion by emphasizing that a deferential standard of review must be applied
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the Secretary of the Treasury to temporarily suspend permits for
the importation of semi-automatic assault weapons, agreeing not
only that the suspension was not done in an arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable manner, but also that the temporary suspension
was not a burden on interstate commerce.5" In so doing, the court
conceded that certain agency decisions impacting upon the importation of guns will be upheld when minimally reasonable.5 4
The judiciary should feel comfortable deferring to
Congress
on gun control questions that relate to the Commerce Clause because the meaning of the Clause has expanded with time, thus allowing for its application to gun control in local communities
without infringing upon states' Tenth Amendment powers. 55 The
judiciary must recognize that legislation with a Commerce Clause
when reviewing an agency's action. Id. (citations omitted). Using a three-part inquiry, the court stated that the Bureau's temporary suspension of permits could be set
aside only if the suspension (1) exceeded the Bureau's statutory authority, (2) violated a constitutional right, or (3) constituted an arbitrary or capricious action. Id.
(citing 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2) (A)-(C) (West 1977)). Under the deferential standard, the
court presumed the validity of the suspension of importation permits. Id. (citation
omitted).
53 Id. at 864-65, 866, 869. See McCauley, supra note 6, at 198 (noting that the Gun
South court held that deference must be given to the Secretary's decision to suspend
importation permits if the Secretary reasonably feared that the assault rifles were not
being used for sporting purposes). Id. (footnotes omitted). The controversy began
when Gun South, Inc. ordered and was granted a permit for 800 AUG-SA rifles, which
were considered sporting rifles. Gun South, 877 F.2d at 860. McCauley argued that
Gun South alerts gun importers that their importation permits may be suspended at
any time, even after weapons have been ordered and purchased. McCauley, supra
note 6, at 206 (footnotes omitted). McCauley found that the Secretary of the Treasury needs to base the permit suspensions merely upon reasonable grounds such as
public safety in order for the court to give it deference. Id. at 206-07 (footnote
omitted).
54 Gun South, 877 F.2d at 865 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1977)). See also McCauley, supra note 6, at 204-05. McCauley noted that the court deferred to the ATF
because the Bureau is best equipped to ascertain whether assault weapons are suitable
for sport. Id. (footnotes omitted).
55 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (providing that "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people").
Prior to Lopez, the Gun-Free School Zones Act was not deemed an usurpation of
state police power under the Tenth Amendment. See United States v. Glover, 842 F.
Supp. 1327, 1328-29 (D. Kan. 1994). The defendant in Glover argued that the Gun
Free School Zone Act was unconstitutional because it infringed upon the Tenth
Amendment right of the states to control schools and education. Id. at 1328-29 (citations and footnotes omitted). The Glover court held the Gun Free School Zone Act
constitutional under the Commerce Clause because Congress has the power to regulate activities affecting commerce. Id. at 1332, 1336-37 (citations omitted). The court
also noted that gun control legislation need only meet rational basis review to survive
constitutional muster. Id. at 1336-37 (citations omitted).
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nexus need only pass rational basis review.5 6 This review demands
a means/ends nexus, which requires the judiciary to defer to the
legislature and to uphold legislation when the means of that legislation is rationally related to the legislation's ends.5 7 If rational basis review is not implemented when gun control legislation is
premised upon the Commerce Clause, the judiciary will erode the
meaning of the Clause that has consistently evolved over the course
of this century.5" Conjunctively, before the legislature can continue to take full advantage of the Commerce Clause nexus when
formulating gun control legislation, it is imperative for the courts
to articulate a final interpretation of the Second Amendment that
reflects its history and meaning.5 9 Once the meaning of the Sec56 See STONE, supra note 19, at 809 (instructing that rational basis review has been
employed to uphold regulatory legislation affecting commerce) (quoting United
States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938)). In United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., the Supreme Court argued:
Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of judicial
notice, such facts may properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry
.... As that decision was for Congress, neither the finding of a court
arrived at by weighing the evidence, nor the verdict of a jury can be
substituted for it.
304 U.S. at 153, 154 (quotations omitted); see also STONE, supra note 19, at 532-33
(proposing that the judiciary has traditionally employed rational basis review of equal
protection questions for those classifications not drawn on a suspicious basis).
57 STONE, supra note 19, at 545. For a thorough discussion of the means/ends
nexus and rationality, see Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Modelfor a Newer EqualProtection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972-73). Gunther
proposes that vigorous equal protection scrutiny would measure the acceptability of
legislative means according to legislative purpose, rather than being based upon the
individual value judgments of the Justices. Id. at 21.
58 See United States v. Lopez, No. 93-1260, 1995 WL 238424, at *44 (Apr. 26, 1995)
(finding that the Court could hold the Gun-Free School Zones Act constitutional by
"apply[ing] pre-existing law to changing economic circumstances") (Breyer, J., dissenting). In the dissent, Justice Breyer found that the Lopez decision contradicts contemporary Supreme Court cases "that have upheld congressional actions despite
connections to interstate or foreign commerce that are less significant than the effect
of school violence." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146, 154 (1971)) (other citations omitted). Justice Breyer concluded that "upholding
this legislation would do no more than simply recognize that Congress had a "'rational basis"' for finding a significant connection between guns in or near schools and
(through their effect on education) the interstate and foreign commerce they
threaten." Id. at *47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
59 See Kluin, supra note 17, at 251 (footnote omitted) (noting the lack of Supreme
Court case law addressing the historical meaning of the Second Amendment). Notably, United States v. Hale involved interpretation of both the Commerce Clause and the
Second Amendment. 978 F.2d 1016, 1017 (8th Cir. 1992). In Hale, Wilbur Hale appealed his conviction for machine gun possession by arguing that the statute under
which he was convicted had no nexus with interstate commerce and that his indictment violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms. Id. (citations omitted).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found the statute to be
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ond Amendment is clear, courts will then be able to determine the
appropriate level of review by which to scrutinize legislation that is
Clause and later challenged on Secpremised upon the Commerce
60
ond Amendment grounds.
III.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND FORMULATION OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW

For the judiciary to assume a complete role when deciding
gun control cases, it must evaluate the scope of current products
liability law and decide the proper application of the law to gun
manufacturers sued by victims of gun violence. 6 1 Products liability
law developed through privity of contract principles6 2 and the thewithin Congress's commerce power. Id. at 1018. The court also found that a "claimant of Second Amendment protection must prove that his or her possession of the
weapon was reasonably related to a well regulated militia." Id. at 1020 (citation omitted). The court stated that to protect Second Amendment rights to weapon possession a claimant must show that he belonged to a military organization or that use of a
weapon was essential for his preparation for the military. Id. (citation omitted). The
court determined that Hale did not prove a relationship between his weapon possession and "the preservation of a well regulated militia." Id.
60 See United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 293, 295 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation
omitted) (finding the Gun Free School Zones Act to be a permissible exercise of
Congress's Commerce Clause power, and that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the Act as overbroad in its application to individuals driving past a school with a
gun in the car).
61 See Halbrook, supra note 7, at 364 (noting numerous unresolved questions as to
the scope and degree of manufacturer liability and the extent to which consumers
should be protected). Halbrook characterized the trend to ban handgun ownership
through products liability law as a strategy to "make it financially impossible to make,
sell, or own handguns, should suppliers and consumers of this product be required to
absorb all losses of all persons victimized with handguns." Id. at 351. Halbrook proposed that under a strict products liability theory, handguns would be deemed unreasonably dangerous or defective products. Id. Furthermore, Halbrook argued that
such a theory denies any social utility of handguns for self-defense. Id. at 352. Accordingly, Halbrook proposed that tort law should be used not to endanger the existence of handguns in society, but to ensure that handguns are produced with
sufficient safety mechanisms and reliability for individuals that wish to purchase them.
Id. at 364.
62 DOBBS, supra note 7, at 609-10. Until MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., manufacturers were not liable to a plaintiff where the plaintiff did not purchase the product
directly from the manufacturer. Id. (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E.
1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916)) (other citations omitted). In MacPherson,Justice Cardozo
explained: "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life
If [the
and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger ....
manufacturer] is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability will follow."
Macpherson, 111 N.E. at 1053. Thus, per MacPherson, a plaintiff, injured when the
wheel of an automobile collapsed, could sue the manufacturer even though the plaintiff purchased the car from a retail dealer and not directly from the manufacturer.
DoBBs, supra note 7, at 610.
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ory of express and implied warranties.6 3 Since those beginnings,
products liability law has developed various nuances: manufacturer liability for defective products that result from production
flaws;14 manufacturer liability for defective design of products;6 5
risk/utility analyses and limited manufacturer liability for unavoid63 DOBBS, supra note 7, at 611-12 (citation omitted). For an earlier interpretation
of implied warranties, see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (NJ.
1960). Hennigsen rejected the privity rule and found that the attempts by a manufacturer and dealer to limit their liability by placing a warranty on their automobiles for
replacement of defective parts within a specified time was not a valid disclaimer of
liability. Id. at 76-84. The court further concluded that there was an implied warranty
in addition to the express warranty for replacement of defective parts. Id. at 84. The
NewJersey Supreme Court ultimately held that an implied warranty of use for a product's designated purpose extends from the manufacturer through the dealer to the
consumer. Id.; see also DOBBS, supra note 7, at 612 (contending that since Henningsen, warranty theory has for the most part been replaced by a theory of strict liability
in tort).
For a later interpretation of implied warranties, see Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 577, 578 (Ohio 1981). In Leichtamer, the plaintiffs were
injured when the Model CJ-7Jeep in which they were riding rolled over after negotiating a sloped hill. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court promulgated the following definition
of implied warranties:
The doctrine of "breach of implied warranty" as charged in the complaint does not depend upon proof of fault. A claim predicated upon
breach of implied warranty proceeds upon a legal theory that one who
provides a product impliedly represents to consumers or users of that
product that it is a good or sound product. In the event it should thereafter develope [sic] that the product was not a sound or good product
and a consumer or user thereof sustains an injury due to a defect
therein, the manufacturer has breached its implied warranty.
Id. at 577 n.2. Ultimately, the court held theJeep manufacturer liable in tort for the
manufacture of this unreasonably dangerous product. Id. at 574.
64 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1962). In
Greenman, the plaintiffs wife bought him a Shopsmith power tool. Id. at 898. After
properly operating the tool as a lathe, the plaintiff was seriously injured. Id. The
Supreme Court of California found that the tool had been defectively manufactured
and negligently constructed. Id. at 901. The court explained that: "The purpose of
[imposing strict liability on the manufacturer] is to ensure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves." Id. (citation omitted); see also DOBBS, supra note 7, at 617-18 (surmising
that the Greenman decision eliminated the privity problem of strict products liability
by breaking away from the warranty theory).
Following the decision in Greenman, Dobbs stated that the American Law Institute
adopted § 402A to the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. at 617. This section
changed strict products liability through its three main components:
(a) sellers are strictly liable for injuries; this meant that the injured consumer could recover without proving fault; (b) privity rules were abolished; this meant that the injured consumer could recover without
privity; and (c) strict liability attached to products that were "defective"
because they were unreasonably dangerous to the consumer.
Id. at 617-18. The phrase "unreasonably dangerous" is used to acknowledge that some
products, such as a knife, are naturally dangerous and not defective. Id. at 628. A
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ably unsafe products.6 6 Generally, in assessing manufacturer liability, courts now apply a risk/utility test that entails a balancing of a
product's usefulness with its potential harm to consumers.6 7
In Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc.,68 the Oregon Supreme Court
addressed the issue of imposing liability on a gun manufacturer
plaintiff must prove that at the time a product left a defendant's hands it was defective, and when this is not proven, a plaintiff will be foreclosed from recovery. Id.
65 See DOBBS, supra note 7, at 630. Dobbs contrasted manufacturing defects with
design defects, stating "[i]f a product is flawed, only a few products with flaws will be
in circulation; but if a product is misdesigned, every one of the products represents a
potential lawsuit against the manufacturer." Id. Dobbs cited Leichtamer for a definition of design defects and an explanation of the concept of unreasonably dangerous.
Id. (citing Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 576-77 (Ohio
1981)). In Leichtamer, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated that a product has a design
defect and is unreasonably dangerous when it fails to perform safely when used as
intended. Leichtamer, 424 N.E.2d at 577 (footnote omitted).
66 See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 7, at 632, 634 (citing Knitz v. Minster Machine Co.,
432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio 1982)). Dobbs compared the Knitz court's reasoning with
Cochran v. Brooke's unavoidably unsafe products analysis as defined in § 402A Comment k to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and suggested that although phrased
differently, the two analyses were effectively the same. Id. In Cochran, the court held
that a manufacturer of chloroquine was not strictly liable for the plaintiff's almost
total loss of vision that occurred after the plaintiff used the drug. Id. at 636 (citing
Cochran v. Brooke, 409 P.2d 904,906-07 (Or. 1966) (en banc); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965)). Comment k to § 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts states in part:
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe
for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in
the field of drugs.... The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict
liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful
and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k. The Cochran court reasoned
that imposing strict liability on drug manufacturers would have far-reaching consequences that the court could not feasibly impose. Cochran, 409 P.2d at 907.
67 See Bogus, supra note 5, at 1109. Courts today examine products in terms of the
reasonableness of their dangers. Id. Courts often conduct a cost-benefit analysis
wherein they balance the benefit of a product to the consumers against potential
harm. Id. Courts have opted to use this risk-benefit analysis because the earlier consumer expectation test, wherein consumers had the responsibility of anticipating
whether a product would be too dangerous for personal use, was unsound. Id.
Through a risk-benefit analysis, courts decide that a product whose risks outweigh its
benefits is unreasonably dangerous and therefore warrants imposition of strict liability. Id.
68 704 P.2d 118 (Or. 1985). For further commentary on Burkett see Chris Laia,
Developments in the Law, Supreme Court Shoots Down Propositionthat the Design, Manufacture, and Marketing of Smal Easily Concealable Handguns Constitutes an Abnormally
DangerousActivity, 22 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 209, 212-13 (1986) (citations and footnotes omitted). Laia suggests that it may be possible to hold the user, rather than
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when the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of a concealable gun. 69
The plaintiff had been seriously and permanently injured when an
inmate shot him in the head with an easily concealable Freedom
Arms handgun while attempting to escape fromjail. 70 The Oregon
Supreme Court held that the design, manufacture, sale, and marketing of a small, easily concealable handgun did not warrant imposition of strict liability on the manufacturer under Oregon law
because such actions did not constitute an abnormally dangerous
activity. 71 The court reasoned that the manufacturer's activities in
developing the concealable gun were not inherently dangerous.7 2
Moreover, the court declined to impose strict liability on the gun
manufacturer
because it did not want to create enterprise liability. 73 The court intimated, however, that the use of a gun may be
manufacturer, of small, easily concealable handguns liable in tort under a strict liability theory. Id. at 212-13.
69 Burkett, 704 P.2d at 119.
70 Id. Plaintiff Burkett was injured by a .22 caliber single-action handgun commonly known as a Freedom Arms handgun. Id. This handgun is manufactured "so as
to be concealable as a decorative item on the front of a large belt buckle." Id. This
handgun was also offered for sale to the general public. Id.
71 Id. at 122. The court acknowledged that any prior Oregon decision which held
that the use or storage of benign or dangerous substances may constitute an abnormally dangerous activity was based upon the danger inherent in those activities. Id. at
121. The court found no correlation between the use or storage of substances and
the manufacture of small, easily concealable guns. Id. (citations omitted). In essence,
the court intimated that the manufacturing process is not abnormally dangerous, and
thus manufacturers cannot be held strictly liable where plaintiffs fail to specifically
allege that there is an inherent and unreasonable hazard in the use of the product.
Id. at 122.
72 Id. at 121-22 (citations omitted). The court stated that § 520 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts identifies six factors attributable to an abnormally dangerous activity. Id. at 120 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1965)). Section
520 provides:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land
or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on;
and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
73 Burkett, 704 P.2d at 122 (footnote and citation omitted). The Supreme Court of
Oregon reached that conclusion based on the determination that the plaintiffs were
attempting to impose strict liability on the manufacturers of a non-defective product
without alleging that manufacturing is inherently dangerous. Id. at 121 (citations
omitted). The court furthered that such an allegation is unprecedented in Oregon
and all other jurisdictions that have been faced with such a question. Id. (citations
omitted).
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characterized as an abnormally dangerous activity because the danger in terms of usage, as opposed to the design, manufacture, and
sale of guns, inheres in the activity itself.74
In Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc.,75 the Maryland Court of Appeals also rejected the idea of holding gun manufacturers strictly
liable under the abnormally dangerous activity analysis or the defective products analysis of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.7 6 In Kelley, Mr. Kelley was shot in the chest by an unknown
assailant during an armed robbery of the grocery store in which he
worked.7 7 Kelley and his wife brought a tort action against the
manufacturer and marketer of the handgun used in the commission of the crime. 78 The weapon at issue was a Saturday Night Special, an inexpensive, easily concealable, and unreliable gun
frequently used by criminals. 79 The court found that imposition of
liability on the manufacturer and marketer of the handgun would
In regard to the concept of enterprise liability, the Supreme Court of Oregon
stated:
to hold one who designs, manufactures and sells a nondefective product
strictly liable for the sole reason that the subsequent use or misuse of
the nondefective product carries a grave risk of harm which cannot be
avoided by due care would amount essentially to the imposition of enterprise liability. This court has rejected enterprise liability standing
alone as a justification for the imposition of strict liability.
Id. at 122 (footnote and citation omitted).
74 Id. at 121. The court found Burkett's cause of action problematic because he
never claimed that the use of a small, easily concealable handgun was an abnormally
dangerous activity. Id.
75 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985).
76 Id. 1147-48 (citations omitted). The Maryland Court of Appeals found that
§ 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was inapplicable in Ke/!ey because to
apply, the gun would have to be defective when sold. Id. at 1148 (citations omitted).
The court reasoned that the possibility of using a handgun to inflict injury in criminal
activity does not render the weapon defective. Id. In conclusion, the court posited
that one should not confuse the normal use and possible dangerousness of a product
with that product's defective design. Id.
77 Id. at 1144.
78 Id. at 1144-45. The handgun used in the armed robbery was a Rohm Revolver
Handgun model RG-38S, serial number 0152662, manufactured, marketed, assembled, and sold by Rohm Gesellschaft and its Florida based subsidiary, R.G. Industries.
Id. The plaintiffs asserted several theories of recovery against defendants Rohm Gesellschaft and R.G. Industries. Id. at 1145. The first claim was strict liability for the
manufacture of an abnormally dangerous handgun. Id. The second theory alleged
that the handgun was defective in its marketing and design, which rendered it unreasonably dangerous. Id. The third and fourth claims asserted negligence and loss of
consortium. Id.
79 Id. at 1153-54 (footnotes omitted). The court defined a Saturday Night Special
as an innacurrate, unreliable, small, lightweight, cheap, poorly manufactured, easily
concealable handgun with a short barrel, which is frequently used in criminal activity.
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fail under the general consumer expectation test8 ° and found the
risk/utility test inapplicable.8 1 Alternatively, however, the court expressed that the common law should change with the times.8 2 Accordingly, in the interest of public policy, the court was willing to
carve out a separate category of liability for manufacturers of Saturday Night Specials, where the weapons were used in criminal activity to harm innocent persons.8 3 The court concluded that in
future cases involving injuries or deaths caused by weapons substantially resembling Saturday Night Specials, liability may be im80 Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 958 (Md. 1976) (citation omitted). After discussing the various justifications for imposing strict liability, the Phipps
court adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. Id. at 958-63 (citations omitted). Phipps articulated the consumer expectation test as follows:
For a seller to be liable under § 402A, the product must be both in a
"defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous" at the time that it
is placed on the market by the seller. Both of these conditions are explained in the official comments in terms of consumer expectations. As
Comment g explains, the requirement of a defective condition limits
application of § 402A to those situations where "the product is, at the
time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the
ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." An
"unreasonably dangerous" product is defined in Comment i as one
which is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics."
Id. at 959.
Following Phipps, the Maryland Court of Appeals stated in Kelley that a consumer
would "expect a handgun to be dangerous, by its very nature, and to have the capacity
to fire a bullet with deadly force." Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1148. The appellate court further noted that for a handgun to be defective, "there would have to be a problem in
its manufacture or design, such as a weak or improperly placed part, that would cause
it to fire unexpectedly or otherwise malfunction." Id.
81 Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1149. The court defined the risk-utility test as follows:
[a] product may... be found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product's design proximately caused his injury and the
defendant fails to establish, in light of the relevant factors, that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger
inherent in such design.
Id., at 1149 (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 456 (1978)). The Kelley
court concluded that where a handgun injured the person at whom it was fired, the
weapon functioned as intended. Id. Thus, the court found that a risk/utility test
should only be applied when a product malfunctions. Id.
82 Id. at 1150-51 (quotation and citations omitted). The court stated that "the
common law is not static; its life and heart is its dynamism-its ability to keep pace
with the world while constandy searching for just and fair solutions to pressing societal problems." Id. (quotation omitted).
83 Id. at 1159. The court recognized that the Saturday Night Special has a minimally legitimate purpose in today's society due to its inaccuracy, unreliability, and
poor manufacture. Id. (quotation omitted). The court also stated that the manufacturer or marketer of a Saturday Night Special knows that it is manufacturing or marketing a product primarily used in committing crimes. Id.
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posed on a manufacturer, marketer, or retailer of such guns.8 4
It follows that the ultimate question to be asked by gun manufacturers and consumers is whether it is fair to hold gun manufacturers liable for providing consumers with exactly what they want.8 5
An answer to this question requires consideration of fundamental
fairness issues inherent in a risk/utility analysis.8" In the interest of
fairness, courts must analyze both the costs that handguns impose
on society and their societal benefits. 7 It is unclear, however,
whether courts want to apply a risk/utility analysis, or any strict
liability analysis, when assessing gun manufacturer liability to the
victims of gun violence. 8 It may be feasible for the judiciary to
view the most appropriate scope of gun manufacturer liability to
the victims of gun violence as follows: (1) liability for the creation
of guns statistically documented as the ones most often utilized in
criminal activities; (2) liability for the creation of guns without adequate warning and/or safety features; and (3) liability for guns created in such a manner that they foreseeably will be used in criminal
activity (i.e. easily concealable, poorly made weapons).89 Although
84 Id. at 1160. The court progressively advocated imposing liability on manufacturers who market dangerous products with knowledge of their probable misuse, reasoning that such activity is unreasonable and irresponsible. Id. (footnote and citation
omitted). For further commentary on Kelley, see Joshua M. Horwitz, Kelley v. R.G.
Industries: A Cause of Action for Assault Weapons, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 125, 130
(1989) (footnotes and citations omitted). Horowitz discusses the Kelley court's application of the following three criteria:
(1) the risk of the product to society outweighs its utility to society;, (2)
the foreseeability or knowledge by the maker or seller that the product
is principally to be used in criminal activity; and (3) the relative degree
of fault between the maker or seller and the innocent victim
Id. (citing Kel/ey, 497 A.2d at 1158-59).
85 See Bogus, supra note 5, at 1111-13 (footnotes omitted) (arguing that it is not
necessarily unfair to hold a seller liable for providing a consumer with a product he
wants when that product causes more harm than good to society).
86 Id. at 1112-13.
87 Id. at 1113. The costs include murders, suicides, accidental deaths, and the economic costs involved in treating survivors of attempts on their lives. Id. The benefits
include self-protection and sport. Id. Bogus argued that his data revealed that handguns impose more of a burden on society than a benefit. See id. at 1112-13 (footnotes
omitted).
88 Id. at 1148 (footnote omitted). According to Bogus, courts most frequently defer to the legislature on the issue of handguns and strict liability. Id. at 1149 (footnote
omitted). Ironically, however, Bogus observed that the courts have ordinarily been
responsible for the development of products liability theory and its application to
many different products. Id. at 1150 (footnote omitted).
89 See Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1153-54 (1985) (footnotes omitted). For further commentary regarding the imposition of tort liability on the manufacturers of Saturday Night Specials, see H. Todd Iveson, Note, Manufacturers'Liability
to Victims ofHandgun Crime: A Common-Law Approach, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 771,790
(1983) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted) (stating that "[a] design defect may be
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courts have developed products liability law and have applied it to
the manufacture of such products as automobiles, tools, and
drugs,9 0 the courts may again be avoiding the opportunity to impose liability on gun manufacturers to avert political
confrontation. 9 1
IV.

CONCLUSION

92
The judiciary fulfills a unique role in American government.
It serves as a check on both the executive and legislative branches
in the interest of promoting democracy.9 3 Ideally, the judiciary
should be free from political influence and individual biases.9 4
The judiciary, however, may not always wish to perform its role as
arbiter of the nation's disputes, especially with regard to such con-

established by showing that an entire product line is unreasonably dangerous").
Iveson articulated that a plaintiff may be able to prove that Saturday Night Specials
are unreasonably dangerous by showing that the likelihood of using a weapon for a
criminal purpose-because of the way in which it is designed-outweighs the benefits
of having these guns available. Id. at 790 (citations omitted). In general, Iveson suggested that manufacturers of handguns may have breached a duty to a victim of criminal handgun misuse by. "1) failing to warn and instruct a handgun dealer or
purchaser adequately; 2) negligently entrusting handguns to dealers or shippers; or
3) designing a type of handgun known as Saturday Night Specials." Id. at 784. According to Iveson, proper warnings or adequate instructions alert purchasers as to
foreseeable dangers arising from misuse or proper handling for safe use. Id. at 785
(citations and footnotes omitted). Iveson argued that manufacturers must also learn
of the sources of guns used for criminal purposes and the logistical methods of keeping these guns away from criminals. Id. at 786 (citations omitted).
90 See Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 576 (Ohio 1981)
(quotation omitted) (defining manufacturers' liability for defective product design);
Cochran v. Brooke, 409 P.2d 904, 907 (Or. 1966) (en banc) (limiting manufacturers'
liability for unavoidably unsafe products); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377
P.2d 897, 900-01 (Cal. 1962) (citations omitted) (defining manufacturers' liability for
producing defective products).
91 See Bogus, supra note 5, at 1150 (footnotes omitted). Bogus further intimated
that the courts are hypocritical in avoiding imposition of liability on gun manufacturers because of impending political controversy, and noted that courts have imposed
liability on manufacturers of other controversial products, such as the fertility drug,
DES, organochlorine pesticides, and asbestos. Id. at 1152-53 (footnotes omitted). Bogus argued that some judges may avoid taking a clear stand on gun control for fear
that commitment on such a controversial issue might label them as judicial activists
and jeopardize their re-election. Id. at 1157 (footnotes omitted). According to Bogus, some judges might fear being accused of controlling tort law development, causing insurance premiums to rise, and inviting litigation. Id. at 1158 (footnotes
omitted).
92 See U.S. CONST. art. III (enumerating the role and responsibilities of the judicial branch).
93 See HAMILTON, supra note 10, at 182 (conceptualizing judicial review).
94 Id.
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troversial issues as gun control.9 5 Therefore, the judiciary should
devise and adopt a system of consistent standards to be used as
guideposts when deciding cases that involve challenges to gun control legislation.9 6
A.

Second Amendment Challenges

The judiciary must determine, based on historical evidence,
the actual meaning, scope, and intent of the Second Amendment.
Courts can achieve this by accepting the predominant interpretations of the Second Amendment and by dismissing those that are
not substantiated by legislative intent.9 7 By embracing a majority
view of the Second Amendment gained through historical research, the judiciary would be able to decide Second Amendment
challenges to gun control armed with knowledge of the intent of
the Framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.98 Once the
judiciary carefully analyzes historical data and reaches a consensus
as to the true meaning of the Second Amendment, courts will no
longer decide challenges to gun control legislation based upon
whim or personal inclinations.99
It is probable that the judiciary has refused to render clear
decisions in Second Amendment challenges to gun control laws so
as to avoid involvement in the political controversy surrounding
95 See Bogus, supra note 5, at 1153 (recognizing that the courts often try to avoid
political entanglements).
96 Recently, Seton Hall University School of Law instituted a gun clinic, as part of
its clinical program, in which students represent victims of gun violence. See Bulletin:
SETON HALL SCHOOL OF LAW, SCHOOL OF LAW BULLETIN 45 (1995-97). As part of
this program, students devise constitutional arguments for their clients based upon
challenges to gun control laws. Id.
97 See supra notes 13 & 14 (tracing the inconsistent historical interpretation of the
Second Amendment).
98 See Bordenet, supra note 3, at 1-2, 30 (footnotes omitted). Bordenet surmised
from Supreme Court precedent that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights were to be
broadly construed. Id. at 1-2 (citation omitted). In specific regard to the Second
Amendment, Bordenet argued that the Framers of the Constitution debated incessantly over the right of individuals to keep and bear arms. Id. at 8-13. Bordenet stated
that both James Madison and the First Congress rejected any suggestions that the
Second Amendment be worded without a provision concerning the right of the people to bear arms. Id. at 14. Based upon historical documentation, Bordenet declared
that the purpose of the Second Amendment was "to prevent the establishment of
large standing armies by the federal government by guaranteeing the right of the
people to keep and bear arms so as to provide the foundation for a national militia as
the preferred armed service of the federal government to suppress insurrections and
repel invasions." Id. at 16.
99 See supra notes 13-14 (illustrating the vast inconsistency in courts' approaches to
gun control legislation challenges).
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individual gun ownership. 100 In that sense, one must commend
the judiciary for avoiding political entanglements." 1 On the other
hand, by refusing to follow consistent standards in decision making, the judiciary has failed to properly review Second Amendment
challenges to gun control legislation, succumbing to the political
factions that oppose judicial activism.102 Thejudiciary must realize
that consistency and accuracy in Second Amendment
interpreta10 3
review.
judicial
of
exercise
proper
a
tion is
B.

Commerce Clause Challenges

The judiciary had, until Lopez, 11 4 reviewed properly Commerce
Clause challenges to gun control legislation and effectively had adhered to a standard of rational basis review in that vein.1 5 In future cases involving a nexus between gun control and the
Commerce Clause, the judiciary should give deference to legislative or agency decisions as seen in Gun South.1 06 Continued deference to legislative regulations or statutes that have the effect of
controlling guns in the marketplace is appropriate because the legislature has the capacity to debate the advantages and disadvan10 7
tages of such legislation and ultimately to implement it.

Furthermore, the political process will serve as a check on any un100 See Bogus, supra note 5, at 1156-64 (footnotes omitted). Bogus attributed the
judiciary's reluctance to become involved in the gun controversy to several factors. Id.
These factors include the large gun-consumer constituency, gun lobbies, judicial election concerns, criticism ofjudicial activism, backlash over tort reform, and influence
of powerful interest groups. Id.
101 See HAMILTON, supra note 10, at 181-84 (discussing the necessary independence of the judiciary and emphasizing that the courts, in interpreting the law, serve
as an intermediary between the people and their congressional representatives).
102 See Bogus, supra note 5, at 1156-64 (footnotes omitted) (exploring the various
political influences that have swayed court opinions). Hamilton implored the judiciary to fulfill its role as a guarantor of the rights of the people as articulated by the
Constitution. HAMILTON, supra note 10, at 182-83. Hamilton viewed legislation as
subordinate to the meaning and intent of the Constitution's provisions. Id.
103 But see Bogus, supra note 5, at 1161 (noting that in this era of tort reform, it is
unrealistic to assume that courts will be unaffected by political pressures, and explaining that courts' fears regarding judicial activism are to be expected).
104 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (failing to defer to Congress by
finding the statute in question unconstitutional).
105 See, e.g., Gun South, Inc. v. Brady, 877 F.2d 858, 861 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying a
rational basis test to a Commerce Clause challenge of gun control legislation).
106 McCauley, supra note 6, at 206 (footnote omitted) (arguing that "[a]s long as
the agency bases its decision on reasonable grounds, the reviewing court should follow the deferential standard of review established by the APA").
107 See U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (recognizing that regulations of interstate commerce are to be created and debated by the legislature without judicial
interference).
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reasonable exercises of legislative power by replacing those members of the legislature whose policies encroach upon the rights of
the populace.108
In order to solidify a workable standard, the judiciary must
continue to defer to the legislative branch on questions that involve gun control and interstate commerce. The judiciary must
also recognize that ignoring the Second Amendment may impact
negatively the viability of controlling guns through legislation prebecause too many possibilities
mised upon the Commerce10 Clause,
9
for levels of review remain.

C. Products Liability Challenges
Lastly, it is imperative that the judiciary create a guiding standard by which products liability principles can be reviewed when
applied to gun manufacturers.110 Based upon the lessons of the
past, the judiciary should realize that standardless decision-making
leads to inconsistency, confusion, and needless debate.'11 In deciding the scope and extent of liability for the design and manufacture of guns, the judiciary should impose a liability that balances
the interests of manufacturers, public safety, and individual Second
108 See Mark Udulutch, Note, The ConstitutionalImplications of Gun Control and Several
Realistic Gun Control Proposals, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19, 43 (1989) (footnotes omitted)
(stating that Congress often uses the Commerce Clause to draft gun control statutes
because it is not difficult to create a rational argument that can receive deference
from the courts). The judiciary has referred to the history of the clause when faced
with challenges to gun control legislation, and has hooked its analysis in the clause as
a constitutional rationale for banning firearm possession. See Reddick, supra note 6,
at 872 (citation omitted). Therefore, the example of the judiciary's interpretation of
Commerce Clause challenges to gun control legislation is instructive because it demonstrates that an understanding of a constitutional provision's historical meaning is
essential to consistent analysis and decision making. See supra notes 37 & 38 (explaining the historical development of Commerce Clause analysis).
109 See Udulutch, supra note 103, at 33 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146,
156 (1971)) (other citations omitted) (finding that since Perez v. United States, courts
defer to Congress on any rational argument that shows a nexus between commerce
and the activity to be regulated).
110 Cf Mary Becker, Conservative FreeSpeech and the Uneasy CaseforJudicialReview, 64
U. COLO. L. REV. 975, 975-77 (1993) (footnotes omitted) (arguing that binding judicial review paralyses the legislature, weakens political movements, and fails to ensure
positive social change). See generallyWojciech Sadurski, ConventionalMorality andJudicial Standards,73 VA. L. REV. 339 (1987) (discussing the balance between predominant standards ofjudicial lawmaking and the conventional morality theory ofjudicial
review which embraces the idea that courts interpreting moral questions frequently
refer to prevalent community values).
111 See supra notes 13 & 14 (tracing the historical developments illuminating the
inconsistent decision making).
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Amendment rights.11 2 The judiciary has assumed primary responsibility for molding
products liability law and can continue to carve
13
nuances.'
out
The time has come for the judiciary to utilize all of its resources in dealing with the nation-wide problem of gun violence.
One should not view this urging as a mere call for judicial activism
but, rather, as a call to duty to the judiciary to rule consistently on

gun control laws within constitutional parameters and pursuant to
adopted standards. Should the judiciary fail to meet this obligation
by refusing to adopt a unified and consistent approach to gun control analysis, a nation besieged by gun violence will be encouraged
to control guns without judicial review, perhaps embracing nondemocratic alternatives.
MicheUe Capezza

112 See Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 704 P.2d 118, 122 (Or. 1985) (recognizing the
dangers of handguns but declining to impose enterprise liability); see also Halbrook,
supra note 7, at 365 (suggesting that an individual can only exercise the right to keep
and bear arms if arms exist in society). In the future, it may be possible to institute
tort actions against the users of guns for engaging in inherently dangerous activities.
See Burkett, 704 P.2d at 121 (suggesting that tort actions against gun users are a future
possibility). While manufacturers may be more desirable as defendants in tort actions, successful suits under current law are unlikely because manufacturing is not an
inherently dangerous activity. See id.
113 See, e.g., Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985) (carving out an
exception to current restrictions on gun manufacturer liability for a limited type of
handgun and reminding that the law, as a function of society, must seek justice in
light of current circumstances and knowledge).

